When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

1956 Episode 1.15 examines the final moments of Imre Nagy, as the Soviet noose tightened around him.

But the Kremlin was not safe yet. Of particular concern to Moscow and to the Hungarians was the stance of Yugoslavia, as its embassy in Budapest provided asylum to Imre Nagy and 40 other individuals responsible for guiding and leading the momentarily independent Hungarian state. The revolution may have been crushed within a few days, but it was evidently not going to be so simple to remove the memory of Nagy. Although normal Hungarian citizens couldn’t know of his fate, even when he was tricked into leaving this safe haven in late November, behind the scenes the Soviet-Yugoslav diplomacy was only serving to heighten tensions in the communist world.

In addition, the Chinese, soon to visit the Eastern satellites in January 1957, had their own comments to make on the events in Hungary. The Chinese conclusion, and the conclusion which has largely survived as canon to this day, was that Vladislav Gomulka had only gone so far, whereas Imre Nagy had gone far too far in bringing reform to his country. It was not acceptable, in the Chinese mind, that reform came at the expense of Soviet power and stability – a national road to socialism was to be admired, but this road could be bumpy, and on occasion, fraught with danger.

Also worth considering was the American perspective – Eisenhower’s administration was thoroughly distracted by events in Egypt, and while he and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles never really intended to intervene with force in Hungary, the unofficial state organs like Radio Free Europe ensured that the American or at least the Western approach and intentions remained unclear to Hungarians, who felt encouraged to challenge the Soviet domination, and were then bitterly disappointed when no Western aid materialised. Suez was of course a convenient excuse for American non-intervention, yet for Eisenhower’s new ‘rollback’ policy towards the Soviet Union, it was important to blame the Anglo-French-Israeli attack upon Egypt to the end...

At the pinnacle of our narrative was the fate of Nagy and his circle. Two years after the revolution had been put down, Nagy was executed. Even in his final moments he refused to admit error and to denounce what had been done. He went to the gallows courageously, confident that no matter what occurred after his death, one day, he would be reburied, and Hungary would be free. His legacy was to inspire Hungarian politicians and a tacit policy of non-violent resistance to Soviet rule throughout the next few decades. His words would prove correct – Imre Nagy’s reburial in June 1989 signalled the end of Soviet domination, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War all at once. Nagy’s death and rehabilitation put to bed the fallout of Khrushchev’s secret speech, and it also concludes our first part of 1956. Next time, we’ll begin our examination of that other significant narrative which 1956 provided, as we count down to the Suez Crisis.