Investing Legends

  • 1. Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1994

    02:56:45||Season 3, Ep. 1
    Chapters see below.Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger take shareholder questions at the 1994 Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, covering intrinsic value, capital allocation, and why they will not step outside the businesses they can actually understand. Buffett opens on derivatives, warning that combining ignorance with borrowed money has always produced interesting consequences, and points to Procter and Gamble as the early evidence. He explains how they discount future cash at a rate set by their certainty about the business, why he would pay two million dollars not to read a seller's projections, and how to judge a management team by how they played the hand they were dealt and how they treat their owners. He rejects volatility as a measure of risk, arguing that a business returning between twenty and eighty percent is treated by the academic world as riskier than one returning five percent every year, and describes pricing catastrophe reinsurance to exposure rather than to recent experience. He also talks about holding more than a billion dollars in cash as an index of management failure, why he has never sold a good business because of a guess about the market, and why he and Munger allocate every dollar themselves with no staff to help them.1:45 - The use of derivatives 4:37 - Investment in Cap Cities 6:37 - After-tax free cash flow value 9:21 - Intrinsic value of the insurance operations 11:30 - Splitting the shares 13:57 - Buffett's use of The Indefensible 14:59 - Management and life goals 18:22 - Question on Ajit Jain 23:36 - Question on Guinness 26:02 - Berkshire after Buffett 28:53 - Reverse splits, 100x returns and stamps 33:41 - Greenspan, the Fed and interest rates 35:26 - Opinions on Berkshire's value 37:31 - Banks and buybacks 42:10 - Leverage at Salomon 47:14 - Sale of a mutual savings and loan 48:56 - Munger on changing his mind 49:41 - The shoe industry 51:25 - The tobacco business 52:40 - Business acquisition considerations 55:13 - The LA quake and insurance 1:00:02 - Recommended books 1:02:35 - Uncertainties for global brand leaders, Nike and Reebok 1:08:15 - Airlines and USAir 1:11:35 - Munger's retirement 1:12:38 - Sale of Cap Cities shares 1:13:53 - Structured settlements 1:14:53 - Wrigley 1:15:58 - Global diversification 1:18:43 - Explaining insurance losses 1:21:02 - Bullish or bearish? 1:25:23 - Private versus public markets 1:30:32 - Berkshire's intrinsic value relative to market price 1:33:59 - The view of risk 1:38:37 - Tax rates 1:42:54 - Interest rate sensitivity in certain businesses 1:45:40 - Retroactive insurance 1:48:34 - Berkshire's preparation for times of distress 1:51:13 - Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae 1:53:14 - Faster information and the cost of a missed opportunity 1:55:39 - Berkshire buybacks and intrinsic value 1:59:40 - Peter Lynch 2:00:47 - Reinsurance 2:06:20 - Guinness 2:06:53 - World Book and the Buffalo News 2:09:18 - Breaking Berkshire into smaller entities 2:11:08 - Sale of General Dynamics 2:12:30 - Volatility in the Berkshire share price 2:16:05 - Question about cash 2:18:09 - Question about Salomon 2:19:14 - The use of puts at Berkshire 2:21:06 - Stories about Berkshire not in the annual report 2:23:11 - Berkshire ending up on an index 2:24:52 - Position sizing in a given security 2:28:16 - Growth at Coca-Cola 2:29:20 - Question on convertible bonds 2:31:02 - Market impact when Berkshire sells a security 2:32:11 - Key-man insurance for Berkshire 2:32:48 - Currency risk in the Guinness investment 2:38:20 - Question on Berkshire's intrinsic value 2:39:31 - Succession at Coca-Cola 2:39:42 - Question on Salomon 2:41:25 - Merits of the different Berkshire holdings 2:43:30 - Method for arriving at an intrinsic value 2:46:49 - Growth rates in companies 2:49:06 - Capital allocation decisions at Berkshire 2:54:18 - Two or three investment lessons from Maynard Keynes
  • 7. Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 1983 (Appendix) Goodwill and its Amortization: The Rules and The Realities

    18:19||Season 2, Ep. 7
    A special deep-dive from Warren Buffett's 1983 Berkshire Hathaway annual report: his famous appendix on Goodwill. Using See's Candies as the real-world example, Buffett explains the crucial difference between "accounting Goodwill," which gets amortized away year after year, and "economic Goodwill," which can actually grow stronger with inflation. He shows why businesses that need little in the way of physical assets — factories, inventory, equipment — often make far better long-term investments than asset-heavy businesses, even when the accounting numbers suggest otherwise. Essential listening for anyone into Warren Buffett, value investing, and how to really judge whether a business is a good purchase.
  • 7. Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 1983

    58:27||Season 2, Ep. 7
    Warren Buffett's 1983 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter is one of the richest in the series. He lays out his famous "Owner-Related Business Principles" — the rules governing how Berkshire treats shareholders — and tells the remarkable story of Rose Blumkin, the Russian immigrant who built Nebraska Furniture Mart from $500 into America's largest furniture store. He explains the crucial difference between book value and true "intrinsic business value," and makes a sharp case against stock splits and high trading turnover, calling a hyperactive stock market "the pickpocket of enterprise." A must-listen for fans of Warren Buffett, value investing, and the history of Berkshire Hathaway.
  • Stan Druckenmiller: The Market as an Economic Predictor

    01:07:37|
    Stanley Druckenmiller talks with John Collison about inflation, bear markets, and why he thinks the odds of a soft landing are remote. He explains the two historical records that have never been broken once inflation passes five percent, argues the Fed's slowness through 2021 and 2022 was enormously costly, and describes a setup he has never faced in forty five years, with eight percent inflation, three percent bond yields, and a weakening economy all at once. He walks through how he reads the economy from inside the stock market rather than from macro statistics, using housing, trucking, and retail as leading indicators, and why the bond market stopped signalling anything after a decade of central bank buying. He also tells the long version of the 2000 story, from shorting ten internet stocks and losing three times his money in four weeks, through the tech position that put him down eighteen percent, to the four-month sabbatical in Africa that let him come back and make forty percent in a single quarter. Along the way he explains why sizing is most of the game, why he tracks whether he is hot or cold before deciding how big to bet, and why he buys first and does the analysis afterward.
  • 6. Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 1982

    52:43||Season 2, Ep. 6
    Warren Buffett's 1982 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter introduces one of his most important ideas: the difference between "accounting earnings" and "economic earnings" why a company's true value includes profits it doesn't even get to report. He explains why insurance industry economics had permanently shifted, praises GEICO's Jack Byrne with the memorable line "Let Jack Do It," and delivers a masterclass on why using company stock to fund acquisitions so often destroys shareholder value, worked through with vivid analogies from toads to farms. He closes by laying out his exact acquisition criteria and paying tribute to two longtime managers on their retirement. Essential listening for fans of Warren Buffett, value investing, and Berkshire Hathaway's history.
  • Ray Dalio - The Principles for Investing and Economics

    42:23|
    Ray Dalio walks through the economic and investment principles behind Bridgewater, laying out how he thinks debt cycles, monetary policy and productivity actually drive markets. He frames the economy as a perpetual motion machine of four forces, three equilibriums and two levers, then applies that template to where the world stood at the time: late in the business cycle, with central banks running out of room and populism rising on both the left and the right. He draws the parallel to the 1930s, explains why the wealth gap became a market issue rather than just a political one, and traces the arc of reserve currencies from the Dutch guilder to the pound to the dollar. On the investment side he covers the difference between alpha and beta, why the assets that just performed well are simply the more expensive ones, and why balancing by risk rather than by dollars matters. The talk closes on what he calls the holy grail of investing, the case that fifteen uncorrelated return streams cut risk by roughly eighty percent without cutting return.
  • 5. Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 1981

    41:30||Season 2, Ep. 5
  • 4. Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 1980

    45:46||Season 2, Ep. 4
    Warren Buffett's 1980 Berkshire Hathaway shareholder letter introduces one of his most enduring ideas: "look-through earnings," his argument that a company's true value includes the retained profits of businesses it partly owns, even when accounting rules don't show them. He revisits his warning on inflation as an "investor's misery index" that quietly erodes real returns, and gives a deep, admiring look at GEICO, comparing its recovery to American Express's after the salad oil scandal. He also warns of a brewing crisis in the insurance industry over hidden bond losses, details the spin-off of the Illinois National Bank, and closes with a heartfelt tribute to longtime banker Gene Abegg. Essential listening for fans of Warren Buffett, value investing, and Berkshire Hathaway's history.
  • Howard Marks: AI, Value Investing, Market Cycles, Investor Psychology

    36:26|
    Howard Marks in conversation about market cycles, investor psychology, and where the current market sits on the swing from optimism to fear. He works through three of his memos, explaining why cognitive dissonance lets markets ignore bad news until a critical mass of it arrives, why waiting for the bottom is the wrong question, and how Oaktree came to invest four hundred and fifty million dollars a week in the weeks after Lehman failed. He also revisits the growth versus value divide he now thinks is a false one, argues that selling should be treated as a decision to un-buy, and uses Amazon and the Nifty Fifty to show how much money is lost by getting off a good idea too soon. The conversation closes with the tennis analogy behind his whole philosophy, and why avoiding losers works in credit but not everywhere.Recorded in april 2026.
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