{"version":"1.0","type":"rich","provider_name":"Acast","provider_url":"https://acast.com","height":250,"width":700,"html":"<iframe src=\"https://embed.acast.com/$/9a03fe9e-1ff0-4dcc-b3f6-50bd1f016ea4/0f37232c-5c2b-4a32-a46a-688c950bdf80?\" frameBorder=\"0\" width=\"700\" height=\"250\"></iframe>","title":"Cameron's Referendum","thumbnail_width":200,"thumbnail_height":200,"thumbnail_url":"https://open-images.acast.com/shows/6195701f2eacc3a36070252a/619570bccb3c660012e3d11f.jpg?height=200","description":"<p>David and Helen take a step back to unpick the tortuous history of how we got to the Brexit referendum in the first place.&nbsp;Does the justification Cameron offers in his new memoirs stack up?&nbsp;What was he trying to achieve?&nbsp;And why did we end up with an in/out vote when the political risks were so great?&nbsp;A conversation linked to David's review of Cameron's book in the current 40th anniversary issue of the LRB. <a href=\"https://www.lrb.co.uk/\" target=\"_blank\">https://www.lrb.co.uk</a></p><p><br></p><p>Talking Points:&nbsp;</p><p><br></p><p>Why did Cameron call for an in/out referendum?</p><ul><li>He wanted to reconfigure Britain’s relationship with the EU, not abolish it.</li></ul><p><br></p><p>Let’s take the story back to 2004-2005 and the new constitutional treaty.</p><ul><li>The key question was consent.</li><li>In Britain, there was a push for a referendum. Although Blair was initially opposed, he made a u-turn.&nbsp;</li><li>But the Dutch and the French voted the treaty down before it could happen.</li></ul><p><br></p><p>Then came the Lisbon Treaty.&nbsp;</p><ul><li>Brown decided that this was different than the constitutional treaty and he ratified it without a referendum.</li><li>This creates a political problem. The Conservative Party opposed both the Lisbon Treaty and the way it had been legitimated.</li></ul><p><br></p><p>The constitutional treaty made the EU wary of using referendums to legitimate treaties.</p><ul><li>But Cameron thought there would be another treaty—was this a mistake?</li><li>The European Union Act of 2011 required a referendum for any treaty that would increase the power of the EU.</li></ul><p><br></p><p>By December 2011, Cameron had two issues: the domestic politics of consent, and the risk of being a permanent minority on financial service matters.</p><ul><li>In 2011, it became clear that the ECB would pursue a policy that would make it more difficult for London’s clearing houses to be the center of European trading.&nbsp;</li></ul><p><br></p><p>Ultimately, Britain could not fundamentally reconfigure its relationship with the EU.&nbsp;</p><ul><li>Cameron’s attempt to renegotiate became a perfect example of British weakness and fueled the Leave campaign.</li></ul><p><br></p><p>For what is Cameron personally culpable?</p><ul><li>He knew that Leave could win, but he didn’t make contingency arrangements for leaving.</li><li>When Leave won, the UK entered a constitutional crisis and Cameron just walked away.</li></ul><p><br></p><p>Mentioned in this Episode:</p><ul><li><a href=\"https://www.lrb.co.uk/v41/n19/david-runciman/his-fucking-referendum\" target=\"_blank\">David’s review of Cameron’s memoir</a></li><li><a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg\" target=\"_blank\">Cameron’s Bloomberg speech</a></li><li><a href=\"http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html\" target=\"_blank\">Macron’s 2017 Sorbonne speech</a></li><li><a href=\"https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/01/france-jacques-chirac-death-politics\" target=\"_blank\">More on Chirac</a></li></ul><p><br></p><p><strong>And as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: </strong><a href=\"http://lrb.co.uk/talking\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>lrb.co.uk/talking</strong></a></p>","author_name":"David Runciman and Catherine Carr"}