{"version":"1.0","type":"rich","provider_name":"Acast","provider_url":"https://acast.com","height":250,"width":700,"html":"<iframe src=\"https://embed.acast.com/$/699e36ed123f974082087563/69a1dd63a9760df1fb9fc9e6?\" frameBorder=\"0\" width=\"700\" height=\"250\"></iframe>","title":"SALT I (ABM Treaty) – Part 3: What Was Agreed—and What Was Left Unsaid","description":"When the ink dried on the SALT I agreements, the world exhaled—but carefully. For the first time, two nuclear superpowers had accepted limits on their most dangerous technologies. Yet every word of the treaty was a compromise, and every clause came with questions.\r\n\r\nThe ABM Treaty, signed on May twenty-sixth, nineteen seventy-two, set strict boundaries. The United States and the Soviet Union could each have two anti-ballistic missile sites: one to shield the capital, another to guard an intercontinental missile field. Each site was limited to one hundred launchers and interceptors. This wasn’t just about technology; it was about trust, risk, and the very logic of nuclear deterrence. The treaty also forbade both sides from testing or deploying sea-based, air-based, or mobile ABM systems—no loopholes for new forms of missile defense. The goal was to lock in mutual vulnerability, the uneasy peace of mutually assured destruction.\r\n\r\nLearn more at: https://thetreatyarchive.com/treaty/salt-i-abm-treaty","author_name":"The Archive Network"}