{"version":"1.0","type":"rich","provider_name":"Acast","provider_url":"https://acast.com","height":250,"width":700,"html":"<iframe src=\"https://embed.acast.com/$/696ceb4536ab0b526844a7bb/6af4c16d973efbd7c1c61a7e?\" frameBorder=\"0\" width=\"700\" height=\"250\"></iframe>","title":"Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 1991","description":"<p>The 1991 letter opens with Berkshire’s net worth up 39.6%, and Warren Buffett immediately explaining why that figure flatters him: nearly $1.6 billion of the $2.1 billion gain came from the market re-rating Coca-Cola and Gillette, a double dip that cannot repeat. It is also the year he took a second job — elected interim chairman of Salomon in the wake of its bond-bidding scandal, a move he describes as putting his mouth where Berkshire’s money was, and one he could only make because his operating managers needed no help from him. The intellectual heart of the letter is his distinction between a franchise and a business: a franchise is needed or desired, has no close substitute, and is not price-regulated, which lets it price aggressively and survive inept management, whereas a business earns well only as the low-cost operator and can be killed by poor management. He then applies it to his own media holdings and shows, with brutal arithmetic, how shifting from a 6%-growth assumption to a “bob-around” assumption cuts a property’s value from 25 times earnings to 10 — the day of bullet-proof franchises and cornucopian economics being over. Twenty years after buying See’s for $25 million, he tallies the result: profits up from $4.2 million to $42.4 million on just $18 million of reinvested earnings, plus $410 million distributed along the way, and a lesson in franchises that made Berkshire money in common stocks ever since. He introduces H. H. Brown and its remarkable pay scheme, under which key managers take a $7,800 salary plus a share of profits after a charge for capital; confesses the Fannie Mae mistake that cost shareholders roughly $1.4 billion because he stopped buying when the price rose and then sold in irritation; quotes Keynes on concentrating in the two or three enterprises one truly knows; and notes that calling active traders “investors” is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic. Along the way there is California’s snack-tax taxonomy, in which a Milky Way candy bar is taxable and a Milky Way ice cream bar is not, and the question of what happens when one melts. Essential listening on value investing, economic franchises, business mistakes and Berkshire Hathaway history.</p>","author_name":"Investing Wisdom"}