{"version":"1.0","type":"rich","provider_name":"Acast","provider_url":"https://acast.com","height":250,"width":700,"html":"<iframe src=\"https://embed.acast.com/$/63c7e44c24a7040010747819/63c7e455636a9500104ba21a?\" frameBorder=\"0\" width=\"700\" height=\"250\"></iframe>","title":"How Bureaucrats and Civil Society (can) Facilitate Clientelism","thumbnail_width":200,"thumbnail_height":200,"thumbnail_url":"https://open-images.acast.com/shows/63c7e44c24a7040010747819/63c7e455636a9500104ba21a.jpg?height=200","description":"<p>In the 36th episode of Governance Uncovered,&nbsp;Marcia Grimes and Agnes Cornell joins us to talk about&nbsp;clientelism. More specifically, their paper&nbsp;\"<a href=\"https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/00104140221115171\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Brokering bureaucrats: How bureaucrats and civil society facilitate clientelism where parties are weak</a>\", which focuses on bureaucrats and&nbsp;how their links to&nbsp;civil society&nbsp;can shape clientelism&nbsp;in Peru.&nbsp;Marcia and Agnes are both researchers at&nbsp;the <a href=\"https://www.gu.se/en/quality-government\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Quality of Government Institute</a>, a neighbouring research institute to GLD that addresses&nbsp;the theoretical and empirical problem of how political institutions of high quality can be created and maintained.</p>","author_name":"GLD"}