{"version":"1.0","type":"rich","provider_name":"Acast","provider_url":"https://acast.com","height":250,"width":700,"html":"<iframe src=\"https://embed.acast.com/$/5dd95a53de444bad79c0bda6/5dd95ab5f232b68a32bc9a78?\" frameBorder=\"0\" width=\"700\" height=\"250\"></iframe>","title":"Cameron's Referendum","thumbnail_width":200,"thumbnail_height":200,"thumbnail_url":"https://open-images.acast.com/shows/5dd95a53de444bad79c0bda6/62682eec78120fe3d603021e0a27ca9a.jpg?height=200","description":"David and Helen take a step back to unpick the tortuous history of how we got to the Brexit referendum in the first place.&nbsp;Does the justification Cameron offers in his new memoirs stack up?&nbsp;What was he trying to achieve?&nbsp;And why did we end up with an in/out vote when the political risks were so great?&nbsp;A conversation linked to David's review of Cameron's book in the current 40th anniversary issue of the LRB. https://www.lrb.co.uk\n\n\nTalking Points:&nbsp;\n\n\nWhy did Cameron call for an in/out referendum?\n - He wanted to reconfigure Britain’s relationship with the EU, not abolish it.\n\n\nLet’s take the story back to 2004-2005 and the new constitutional treaty.\n - The key question was consent.\n - In Britain, there was a push for a referendum. Although Blair was initially opposed, he made a u-turn.&nbsp;\n - But the Dutch and the French voted the treaty down before it could happen.\n\n\nThen came the Lisbon Treaty.&nbsp;\n - Brown decided that this was different than the constitutional treaty and he ratified it without a referendum.\n - This creates a political problem. The Conservative Party opposed both the Lisbon Treaty and the way it had been legitimated.\n\n\nThe constitutional treaty made the EU wary of using referendums to legitimate treaties.\n - But Cameron thought there would be another treaty—was this a mistake?\n - The European Union Act of 2011 required a referendum for any treaty that would increase the power of the EU.\n\n\nBy December 2011, Cameron had two issues: the domestic politics of consent, and the risk of being a permanent minority on financial service matters.\n - In 2011, it became clear that the ECB would pursue a policy that would make it more difficult for London’s clearing houses to be the center of European trading.&nbsp;\n\n\nUltimately, Britain could not fundamentally reconfigure its relationship with the EU.&nbsp;\n - Cameron’s attempt to renegotiate became a perfect example of British weakness and fueled the Leave campaign.\n\n\nFor what is Cameron personally culpable?\n - He knew that Leave could win, but he didn’t make contingency arrangements for leaving.\n - When Leave won, the UK entered a constitutional crisis and Cameron just walked away.\n\n\nMentioned in this Episode:\n - David’s review of Cameron’s memoir\n - Cameron’s Bloomberg speech\n - Macron’s 2017 Sorbonne speech\n - More on Chirac\n\n\nAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking  For information regarding your data privacy, visit <a href=\"https://www.acast.com/privacy\">acast.com/privacy</a>","author_name":"David Runciman and Catherine Carr"}