{"version":"1.0","type":"rich","provider_name":"Acast","provider_url":"https://acast.com","height":250,"width":700,"html":"<iframe src=\"https://embed.acast.com/$/5bb26c9287ef87811438a58b/5fb5cc69804a1568da0e0014?\" frameBorder=\"0\" width=\"700\" height=\"250\"></iframe>","title":"Tara Leigh Grove of Versions of Textualism","description":"<p>In this episode, <a href=\"https://www.law.ua.edu/directory/People/view/Tara_Leigh_Grove\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Tara Leigh Grove</a>, Charles E. Tweedy, Jr. Endowed Chairholder in Law at the University of Alabama School of Law, discusses her article \"<a href=\"https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3674050\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Which Textualism?</a>,\" which is published in the Harvard Law Review. Grove begins by explaining the conventional understanding of statutory interpretation as a disagreement between purposivism and textualism. She observes that there is a split within textualism between formalistic and flexible approaches, and points out that different versions of textualism can reach different results, as in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). She argues that formalistic textualism is better, because it constrains judges more effectively and hews more closely to the legislative process. Grove is on Twitter at <a href=\"https://twitter.com/TaraLeighGrove1\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">@TaraLeighGrove1</a>.</p><p>This episode was hosted by&nbsp;<a href=\"http://law.uky.edu/directory/brian-l-frye\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">Brian L. Frye</a>, Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law. Frye is on Twitter at&nbsp;<a href=\"https://twitter.com/brianlfrye\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\" target=\"_blank\">@brianlfrye</a>.</p>","author_name":"CC0/Public Domain"}